secretary ofthe treasury and lord mayor of Berlin; and Erich Simm, Simonsohn's closest confident and a senior administrator in Berlin's municipal government. In an unparalleled attempt to shore up the home meal, German civil authorities assumed direct responsibility for the price, quantity, and quality of grain stores.
Twelve civil servants and sixty-five assistants staffed the office that sought to meet the basic dietary needs of the capital's 3.6 million inhabitants.14 Large enough to generate the steady stream of narrow paper strips that provided Berlin? ers with food, the structure proved far too small to contain the coupons once they completed their migration through the city's tenement-house apartments and its bustling bakeries. The scale of the problem necessitated a larger staff and more space. In the next few years, town fathers would acquire real estate in the city's expensive administrative quarter and employ a battery of high-priced assistants. By the end of the war, twenty-two high-ranking civil servants, over eighteen hundred administrative assistants, and two hundred and forty five vol? unteers checked the weight of flour sacks, distributed cards, and inspected the purity of bread. The customer service section alone, one of the Bread Office's many concessions to consumer goodwill, employed over two hundred people. 15 Every city in Germany had a somewhat different ration, depending on such considerations as its size, proximity to rural areas, municipal competence, and location within the region. In Berlin, acting on guidelines established by imperial authorities, the city's Bread Supply Office initially gave people over the age of eighteen coupons that permitted them to buy 1950 grams of bread, or the equivalent amount of flour, each week. The Office distributed ration cards on a weekiy basis, usually on the Thursday before the start of the next rationing week. Beginning on the following Monday, consumers could exchange coupons at bakery and pastry shops, paying 80 pfennig for either a ration of bread or an equivalent amount of flour. Most preferred bread to flour. Even before the war, the vast majority of Berlin housewives had ceased to bake bread on a regular basis, preferring instead to purchase their loaves, cakes, and sweets at the corner bakery. These purchases constituted a substantial portion of most Berliners' incomes. An average German household in 1914 (with its two adults, three children, and combined annual income of one thousand marks) spent nearly 12% of its income on bread.
To the bakers fell most of the responsibility, if little of the glory, for making the new commercial regime work. Bakers were required to submit new ration coupons weekiy, along with an itemized flour inventory book, to their local bread commission office. While the bread maker anxiously watched, an official weighed his bloated burlap coupon sacks. If the scale confirmed that he had commerced virtuously, the baker received another ration of raw materials for the coming week. Restaurateurs had it easier, at least at first. Much to the chagrin of pastry makers, the owners of the city's restaurants, caf6s, and hotels could serve customers without the bother of cards. Proprietors were merely required to record the purchases of bread. By October 1916, however, even most purveyors of prepared foods had to meet the strict codes of commercial conduct.17
Despite all ofthe new adjustments required, the first weeks of rationing worked surprisingly well. Bakers accustomed themselves to the changes, and consumers set aside skepticism to do their part for the boys at the front. At the prompting of city officials, Berlin women not only agreed to get by with roughly a third less journal of social history winter 1998 bread per week, but also voluntarily gave up bread made from imported white flour in favor of home-grown rye. Convincing Berliners to bake with rye flour was no mean feat, for as those who did not already know soon found out, the coarse grain could only be used to bake bread. 18 The enthusiasm that characterized the first months ofthe controlled economy, however, slowly gave way to the more melancholy mood of fall and winter. Few people had predicted a long war, and virtually no one had expected the hardship the war entailed to last an entire year, much less two, three, and four. No plan existed to replace the intricate network of shops, warehouses, and processing facilities that had delivered bread to the peacetime masses, and there was little room in the city or in the largely urbanized surrounding area to produce grain. The new rationing measures exacerbated relations between city and countryside, as farmers, despite their best efforts, were unable to compensate for the nation's basic dependency on foreign foodstuffs. When farmers hid stores, refused to slaughter animals, or sold grain on the black market, urban bureaucrats had to adjust.19 Much like their counterparts on the general staff, the officials of the city's bread commissions were forced to learn by doing, with predictable results. After a reasonably harmonious first twelve months, the second year brought attempts to prescribe the sizes, shapes, weights, and ingredients of pastries and other bread stuffs. The Bread Office issued stern instructions not to mix foreign with domestic flours. In cases where the grains had nonetheless been combined, pastry makers were instructed to place a sign in the window warning customers that the proprietor offered "baked goods made from foreign flour."20 The year's most notable fiasco followed the attempt of city authorities to replace the long-cherished white-bread breakfast roll with a standard loaf, pro? duced from equal portions of wheat and rye. Bruno Haase, a private citizen from the wealthy district of Charlottenburg, expressed the popular response: "The intention of the city government to do away with the white bread rolls horrifies me. For health reasons, I have been a white-bread eater all ofthe 53 years of my life. If the city goes ahead with its plans for the introduction of a 'standard loaf,' there is no way I will ever be able to satisfy my hunger pangs again."21 Contrary to Mr. Haase's impression, rationing authorities did not intend to be hard-hearted. The nation's sudden shortage of farm hands, the disruption of trade networks, the insatiable needs ofthe army, merchants' speculation, unreliable shipments from the neutrals, and British authorities' decision to impose a "hunger embargo" drove metropolitan authorities to contemplate depriving him of his favorite breakfast rolls. 2 After a storm of consumer protest, Berlin Germany's local councilors were anything but "impotent" in the face of the capital's food problems.30 True, the first frost of autumn 1917 provoked further signs of civil unrest. In September alone, the city's two hundred and forty-six offices witnessed seventeen burglaries, though in only two cases did bandits make off with a substantial booty of rationing cards. Most of the thefts, and, for that matter, other indirect effects of the blockade such as black market activity and urban-rural strains between the capitai and other parts of the country, did not occur during the war, but after its unsuccessful conclusion.31 The availability of food actually increased slightly in the last year ofthe worldwide conflict, though prices had slowly begun to rise. These changes, however, meant little to most Berliners. Their diets, like those of their grandparents, now moved in lock step with the seasons. Things did not really improve until the mid 1920s. In retrospect, the city government's attempts to provision bread stuffs seemed doomed to failure. In contrast to the Austro-Hungarian and Russian monarchies, each of which in peacetime produced more than enough food to feed their populations, before the war Germans imported almost six million tons of fodder, mostly grain, yearly. In fact, the shortfall was larger still, since much of the rye cultivated on German farms was used as fodder, while bread was baked from three million tons of imported wheat. The British embargo ensured that during the war years comparable amounts of rye were diverted from animals to breadmaking.32 Although Britain imported still more wheat, with about four-fifths of its total bread grains coming from abroad, the Royal Navy ensured that Manitoba's wheat continued to reach Manchester's masses. 3 Almost immediately, German citizens journal of social history winter 1998
like Haase demanded that foreign grains return to German kitchens. As the Entente's hunger blockage began to bite, Berlin's bakers rushed to fill the orders of their customers, proving that old habits died hard for producers and consumers alike.
Although they were absolutely crucial to the war effort, the towns, particularly the larger ones, stood at the end of the nation's food supply line. In light of this fact, Simonsohn and his associates in Germany's fifty or so Grojistadte, towns of 100,000 or more inhabitants, grasped that if they were to win on the home front, they would have to ally themselves with both consumers and bakers; no laissez-faire policy as in England would suffice. In Berlin, the greatest fear was that townspeople would revolt against controls. For this reason, city spokesmen rushed to establish their populist credentials. In a rare address to "Berlin's Citizens and Housewives," Simonsohn, a newly-elected member to the city's upper house, complained that bakers were producing "incredibly tiny" breakfast rolls even as grain prices fell. "This lust for profit," he concluded, "must be condemned in the strongest possible terms."34 The government's generous dispersal of blame knew no bounds. In the coming years, Simonsohn and his colleagues hurled abuse at pastry makers: "They bake more pastries than allowed, they sell adulterated flour. They insist on baking more white bread than rye, and many provide favored customers with bread advances." Bakers were accused of falsifying ration cards, honoring cards they knew were imitations, and purposely over-valuing the coupons of favored customers. 35 The pastry makers had good reason to resent these charges. For most ofthe war and the subsequent five hard years of peace, bakers had no control over the type or quality of flour they received. It is hardly any wonder that a nearly decade-long dependence on the city government for flour, coal, wood, and gas bred animosity. With flour making up more than half ofthe cost of production, and eiectricity and coal an additional fifteen percent, each baker's survival hinged upon the municipality's timely delivery of raw materials and energy each week. For the constituents they served, the improvisations of local bureaucrats ameliorated the worst effects of the siege economy. They also, as few historians have acknowledged, sustained the long war effort.
Unfortunately for city officials, those who made the rules which governed food distribution also broke them. The more desperate military leaders became, the greater was their willingness to tinker with the home front's local food markets. Imperial and provincial authorities could not prevent General Erich Ludendorff, quartermaster-general ofthe army and second in command to Field Marshal von Hindenburg, from seizing precious grain resources.
Like the bakers they sought to control, municipal authorities were caught in a double bind. Both pastry cooks and policymakers had to accept the flour given to them and appear thankful to receive it. Both groups were forced to adjust to a constant stream of regulations and had to explain to customers why some grains were available while others were not. Like the provincial and imperial ministers, each existed ultimately to serve the burgeoning needs of the military. All three groups faced citizens' complaints about bread of poor quality. Public outrage against producers, rationing authorities, wholesalers and farmers could, and sometimes did, lead to violence in the streets.
It is no surprise that civil servants and bakers from time to time threw up their hands in despair. Nor is it any wonder, in light of the unprecedented ticipation in its bread rationing program. In order to fiilfill their day-to-day obligations to customers, the city government called upon the assistance of able bureaucrats, loyal bakers, members of organized labor, and representatives ofthe women's movement. Berlin's rationing system created conflicts among consumers, planners, and merchants, but it also contained mechanisms to ensure that tempers did not reach a boiling point. Harsh words and hurt feelings notwithstanding, the bak? ers and bureaucrats worked together in a court of appeals to adjudicate bread producers' grievances. The new body represented both master artisans and se? nior civil servants. Members of the pastry makers' federation and civil servants also sat together in a special division of the Bread Office that was established to catch falsifiers and to eliminate black-market activity. When Berlin's govern? ment leveled charges of unfair trading practices against bakers, it did so with the approvai of at least three of the city's master bakers.
Relations among civil rationing authorities were often tense. Still, here too mechanisms existed to ensure cooler heads prevailed. In both provincial and imperial ministries, the municipal government was far from isolated. Berliners, particularly city officials, were overrepresented in the agencies charged with the national and provincial distribution of meat, fruits and vegetables, potatoes, and bread. Moreover, the lord mayor, formerly a member of the imperial civil service, was on close terms with a number of well-placed government officials, including the emperor, Prime Minister Bethmann-Hollweg, General Ludendorff, and General Kessel. When Simonsohn disobeyed orders, he did so with the full concurrence of the lord mayor, who then turned to his superiors and proclaimed his ignorance, all the while shielding the Bread Office's day-to-day operations from provincial and imperial intervention. In contrast to the state of affairs in Petrograd, where even a suggestion of introducing a rationing system for bread provoked bitter disputes among the workers' representatives, the city administration, and the Imperial bureaucracy, cooperation among German food supply officials guaranteed a daily norm, however low, of flour and bread to all inhabitants. German wartime rationing succeeded because a wide range of consumers sup?
ported it. Gestures of conciliation did not have to be large to be meaningful. Simonsohn knew that the bread scheme worked only when communal author? ities took the time to respond promptly and politely to customers' seemingly endless questions. He understood that the art of civil service lies in the ability to refuse without offending. While anxious to keep the peace within his ex? panding department, Simonsohn nonetheless refused to tolerate rudeness from communal rationing authorities. The local bread commissioners certainly did their best, but sometimes their best simply was not enough. Responding to press complaints that citizens were not being treated with the proper respect, Simon? sohn instructed local managers that "office staffers must meet all public requests with politeness."43 The bread chief helped ensure that professionalism with a personal touch won over the city's skeptical consuming classes.
The Bread Office's gestures of goodwill involved still other, more substantial, concessions to the public. In response to consumer requests, Simonsohn and Simm extended local commissions' hours, from 5 to 8 p.m. on weekdays and added another two hours on Saturday. They also allowed the city's few vegetarians to substitute meat rations for extra barley, semolina, rolled oats, and pasta, as well as providing Jewish citizens with matzos for Passover. They sought to eliminate distinctions between downtown and the suburbs, making where one worked, and, by implication, where one ate, the guiding principle of card distribution. These persistent and ultimately successful efforts to integrate the city's outer districts not only made commuters' lives easier. They also acknowledged the city's real economic boundaries, and thereby laid the groundwork for the provincial entity of Greater Berlin that emerged in 1920.
Enlightened self-interest guided the bread lords' decisions. Keeping managers at their desks well into the evening helped prevent break-ins; providing vege? tarians with alternatives ensured that more meat was available to the rest of the population; and allowing commuters to draw on the inner city's reserves meant that they too had a stake in the system's successful operation.
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